Authority, deliberately.

Account identity, workspace custody and infrastructure trust are separate boundaries.

Account access is not workspace custody

Email and passkeys establish account sessions. Each workspace has independent key material and governance. Recovery of an account does not recover a workspace seed or bypass an active ceremony.

Declare requirements on routes

Session factors, fresh action proofs and quorum approval are enforced centrally from shared route declarations. Products compose capabilities; product-name checks never select a weaker authorization path. A missing ceremony is a prerequisite, not implicit consent.

Protect application-layer communication

The shared post-quantum channel binds service identity, scope, epoch, audience and replay context. Workload Agents receive only declared aliases and capabilities. Encryption is not a substitute for authorization or freshness.

Verify the actual boundary

A container does not establish SEV-SNP confidentiality. Sensitive execution requires accepted guest attestation and current policy. Memory encryption and persistent-storage encryption are separate choices. Host-managed LUKS protects offline storage but does not prove keys are hidden from the host.